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ABSTRAK
Koordinasi antar-lembaga dalam penanganan pendanaan terorisme pada organisasi 
kemasyarakatan (ormas) di Indonesia memiliki beberapa kelemahan. Artikel berikut 
mengaplikasikan analisis tekstual dan pendekatan analisis kebijakan berbasis bukti 
untuk mendapatkan mekanisme koordinasi dari beberapa negara sehingga dapat 
digunakan untuk mendesain sebuah model koordinasi antar-lembaga. Model tersebut 
menjelaskan mekanisme yang dapat memberikan perubahan dan meminimalkan 
risiko pendanaan terorisme pada ormas. Dari analisis yang dilakukan atas beberapa 
negara yang di antaranya adalah Australia, Malaysia, Arab Saudi, dan Singapura, 
artikel ini beranggapan bahwa sebuah mekanisme koordinasi antarlembaga yang 
efektif mencakup di antaranya sinkronisasi atas kebijakan, tugas, fungsi, dan tanggung 
jawab seluruh lembaga yang terlibat. Kemudian, dengan adanya sinkronisasi tersebut 
maka lembaga-lembaga dapat menyusun prioritas intervensi dan alokasi sumber daya 
untuk faktor-faktor yang terdapat pada ormas yang rentan akan pendanaan terorisme. 
Penelitian ini bersifat preskriptif dengan mengusulkan sebuah model koordinasi antar-
lembaga dengan empat mekanisme yaitu usaha kolaboratif untuk menciptakan satu 
database yang terintegrasi, penilaian risiko pada ormas, penentuan prioritas untuk 
pelaksanaan sosialisasi, edukasi, pemantauan, dan pengawasan, serta implementasi 
pendekatan network-model untuk meningkatkan pertukaran informasi secara sukarela.
Kata kunci: kebijakan berbasis bukti, koordinasi antar-lembaga, pendanaan terorisme, 
organisasi kemasyarakatan
ABSTRACT
Indonesian interagency coordination to prevent terrorist-financing offenses by 
nonprofit organizations has several drawbacks. This article applies textual analysis 
and an evidence-based approach to draw effective coordination mechanisms from 
several countries’ experiences and to design a model of interagency coordination. 
The model illustrates mechanisms that can be the drivers of changes and minimize 
ineffective interagency coordination, which may lead to an increase in nonprofit 
vulnerabilities to terrorist-financing offenses. Evidence drawn from several 
countries that are contextually relevant to Indonesia, namely, Australia, Malaysia, 
Saudi Arabia, and Singapore, illustrates that effective interagency coordination 
potentially reduces the risks of terrorist financing and has synchronized policies, 
*The author is a Financial Transaction Supervisor at Directorate of Compliance Supervision, 
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objectives, functions, and responsibilities among authorities. Therefore, authorities 
can prioritize interventions and resources to address the most vulnerable factors. 
This article suggests improvements in four aspects: collaborative endeavors toward 
single integrated databases; comprehensive risk assessment of nonprofits; priority 
settings on socialization, education, monitoring, and supervision; and network model 
to improve voluntary information sharing.
Keywords: evidence-based policy making, joined-up government, terrorist financing, 
nonprofit organization 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.7454/jp.v5i2.264
INTRODUCTION
In 2001, the intergovernmental Financial Action Task Force published 
its Special Recommendations (SRs), which illustrate the connections 
between nonprofit organizations or nonprofits (Casey 2016) and terror-
ist-financing offenses. Historically, the SRs have also observed the in-
tegration of money laundering countermeasures into terrorist-financing 
prevention approaches. In Indonesia, the integration is embodied within 
and implemented by a coordination framework, the National Coordina-
tion Committee (NCC; see Table 1).
Table 1 
Policy and agencies within the National Coordination Committee (NCC)
Policy arrangements Policy instruments Members of NCC in the prevention of terrorist-financing 
offenses by nonprofits 
Prevention and 
mitigation
Supervision and 
monitoring 
Kemenkumham (Kementerian Hukum dan HAM - Ministry of 
Law and Human Rights) 
Information sharing Kemensos (Kementerian Sosial - Ministry of Social Affairs) – 
nonmember of NCC
Socialization and 
education on terrorist 
financing to government 
authorities, financial 
institutions, and 
nonprofit organizations
Kemendagri (Kementerian Dalam Negeri - Ministry of Home 
Affairs)
Kemenlu (Kementerian Luar Negeri - Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs)
Kemenag (Kementerian Agama - Ministry of Religious Affairs)
Law enforcement Investigation and 
prosecution
Densus 88 (Detasemen Khusus 88 Anti Teror - The 
Detachment 88 of the Indonesian National Police)
BNPT (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme - National 
Counterterrorism Agency)
BIN (Badan Intelijen Negara - State Intelligence Agency)
Kejagung (Kejaksaan Agung - Attorney General Office)
PPATK (Pusat Pelaporan dan Analisis Transaksi Keuangan 
- Indonesian Financial Transaction Reports and Analysis 
Centre)
Sources: Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (2018); the Presidential Regulation 
18/2017; the Executive Regulation 58/2016; the Executive Regulation 59/2016
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Indonesian nonprofits, foundations (yayasan) and associations (perkum-
pulan), are the most vulnerable sectors because of sectoral and regulato-
ry vulnerabilities. Sectoral vulnerabilities are significantly high because 
of the nonprofits’ low capacities to prevent and mitigate their operation 
from terrorist-financing risks (Australian Financial Transaction Reports 
and Analysis Centre 2017a, 27–29). During 2015–2017, 292 cases of ter-
rorism or terrorist-financing offenses in Indonesia involved nonprofits; 
this was recorded as the highest among ASEAN, Australia, and New 
Zealand (Pusat Pelaporan dan Analisis Transaksi Keuangan 2015; Aus-
tralian Financial Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre 2016; 2017a). 
However, the government’s responses to that condition were slightly 
insufficient because they loosened their policy, as indicated by the Asia/
Pacific Group on Money Laundering’s (APG) report. The APG notes a 
policy taken by the Indonesian authorities in adjusting the nonprofits’ 
risk levels from high to medium risk in 2018 which was followed by a 
relatively less comprehensive indication of the type of high-risk nonprof-
its (Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering 2008, 28). 
Indonesian regulatory measures such as regulatory oversight, out-
reach to nonprofits, and national cooperation and coordination also 
have potential pitfalls that may contribute to nonprofits’ vulnerability. 
First, in Table 2, some measures in the Civil Society Organization 
Law 17/2013 are considered repressive, discriminatory, and excessively 
bureaucratic, and this sentiment was the same for its predecessor, Law 
8/1985 (The International Center for Not-for-Profit Law 2018). In this 
sense, government interventions to govern nonprofits may experience 
obstacles. 
Another regulation, Presidential Regulation Number 18 of 2017 on 
donations to and from nonprofit organizations, is a progressive step 
because it requires nonprofits to perform activities commonly imple-
mented within financial institutions. However, two critical instruments, 
mandatory reporting activities and the suspicious donation categories, 
are absent in the regulation’s provision. The absence of these instru-
ments may affect the effectiveness of the nonprofit’s terrorist-financing 
countermeasures. Therefore, these pitfalls within the two nonprofit 
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regulations may be counterproductive for the anticipated nonprofit 
compliance levels that were considered the medium level (Australian 
Financial Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre 2017a). 
Table 2 
Provisions of Law 8/1985 and Law 17/2013
Measures Descriptions
Types of 
nonprofits and 
organizational 
changes
Article 8 Law 8/1985 was nuanced with significant control on nonprofit 
activities by the government. Although Law 8/1985 did not regulate the types 
of nonprofits as did Law 17/2013, under the former regulation, nonprofits 
had been obliged to identify and to associate themselves into one group of 
nonprofits that had similar objectives and activities. By contrast, the control 
of the government within Law 17/2013 is under a provision that specifically 
classifies nonprofits into formal (foundation; yayasan) and associations 
(perkumpulan)) and informal. Moreover, the Law obliges nonprofits to report 
within 30 days to either the national or local government any changes in 
management, personnel, and organization structures. Although that obligation 
has no legal consequences, it may potentially impose excessive bureaucratic 
control on civil society activities
Prohibitions and 
obligations
Article 7 Law 8/1985 and Article 21 and 59 Law 17/2013 regulate the ideological 
aspect of nonprofits that should be in accordance with Pancasila and UUD 
1945. These provisions sound positive but they are potentially being abused 
by the government to dissolve any nonprofits critical of the government’s 
policies. On the nonprofit operation level (financial), Law 17/2013 may create 
disputes over the prohibition of nonprofits to receive from and/or transfer any 
funds to any parties not in accordance with government policies
Source: Compiled by author from related sources
These regulatory challenges may create more drawbacks because the 
implementation of terrorist-financing regulations has resulted in dis-
ruptions of nonprofit activities. This disruption may lead to legal and 
reputational consequences for nonprofits unintentionally involved in 
terrorist financing (Bloodgood and Tremblay-Boire 2011; Othman and 
Ameer 2014; Shillito 2015; Australian Financial Transaction Reports 
and Analysis Centre 2017b, 60). Furthermore, a study indicated that 
counterterrorism interventions such as education programs, legislation, 
and punishment (e.g., sentencing) did not statistically illustrate effective-
ness in reducing terrorism offenses across time, and in some cases, the 
interventions counterproductively increased the offenses (Lum, Ken-
nedy, and Sherley 2006, 508).
Second, the findings of the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laun-
dering clearly demonstrated that the existing interagency coordination 
has not significantly improved since 2010, as documented in the NPO 
Domestic Review. The fundamental problems with this coordination 
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are as follows: (1) the registration and validation of nonprofits are spread 
across several ministries; (2) ineffective monitoring and supervision af-
fect the sanctions that are not always imposed on the nonprofits linked 
to terrorist organizations; (3) nonintegrated databases and ineffective 
information sharing, as illustrated by the disagreement among agencies 
regarding the changes of nonprofits’ risk levels from high to medium 
risk; and (4) limited partnerships between the competent authorities and 
nonprofit organizations limit the outreach of socialization and educa-
tional programs (Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering 2008; Pusat 
Pelaporan dan Analisis Transaksi Keuangan 2010).
This article assumes a reciprocal cause and effect between the co-
ordination mechanisms in implementing the policy instruments (Table 
1) and the provisions of two nonprofit regulations, Law 17/2013 and 
the Regulation 18/2017. The ineffective dissemination of information 
among authorities at strategic and operational levels may contribute to 
the regulations’ vagueness and incomprehensiveness, and the regula-
tions’ requirements may result in a coordination mechanism without 
clear strategic and operational plans. For example, Presidential Regu-
lation Number 18 of 2017 generally notes context differences between 
money laundering and terrorist-financing attempts to apply money 
laundering measures well established within the financial industry to 
nonprofits. However, the difference in organizational orientations be-
tween the two sectors may lead to the ineffectiveness of nonprofits’ 
countermeasures. In that sense, such policies may become burdensome 
to authorities (Sinha 2013; Tofangsaz 2015; Hamin et al. 2016). The 
analysis and implementation of countermeasures from other sectors or 
countries against Indonesian nonprofits and terrorist-financing policies 
require an adaptation of their requirements. That contextual adapta-
tion from one sector to another potentially creates an ideal condition 
that stimulates authorities to harmonize their various functions and re-
sponsibilities. However, ironically, these drawbacks of the coordination 
mechanisms are commonly experienced by authorities in the ASEAN, 
Australia, and New Zealand (Australian Financial Transaction Reports 
and Analysis Centre 2017a). 
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Despite that irony and given the global effort to combat terrorism 
and terrorist financing, in this article, we assume that countries can 
learn and adapt to others’ policies and mechanisms. This article em-
phasizes that by drawing on the evidence of countries’ coordination 
mechanisms, we can construct an improved model of interagency co-
ordination that is contextually relevant to Indonesia’s attempt to prevent 
terrorist funding through nonprofits. Relevant to that objective, we post 
the following question: What can be learned from other countries’ experi-
ences of interagency coordination to prevent nonprofit organizations from 
committing terrorist-financing offenses? The following analysis elaborates 
on evidence-based policy-making and joined-up government approaches 
to construct that coordination model. 
EV IDENCE -BASED POLIC Y A NA LYSIS A ND JOINED -UP 
GOV ER NMENT: A N A LTER NATI V E GOV ER NA NCE FOR 
PR EV ENTING TER ROR IST-FINA NCING OFFENSES
The transformation of public governance into so-called private sec-
tor practices was initiated by the new public management (NPM) in 
Anglo-Saxon countries by the late 1980s (Pollitt 2003). NPM had trans-
formed the ideas of neoliberal government into a dominant, hegemonic 
ideology, rather than into other ideas, namely, those of the Weberian 
bureaucracy, which had been criticized as inefficient and irresponsive. 
The idea of the specialization of NPM was initially effective at im-
proving the desired efficiency but was subsequently questioned when 
solving complex problems and to some extent was counterproductive 
to the achievement of overall policy objectives (Ling 2002; Fimreite, 
Christensen, and Lægreid 2012). A study on the United Kingdom’s 
specialization illustrates the phenomenon of departmentalism among 
ministers and government officials (Kavanagh and Richards 2001). In 
the context of specialization, the division of labor that was already es-
tablished within the industrial sector has gained influence over vari-
ous levels of government and transformed the latter to become more 
function specific.
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One alternative to minimizing the effects of specialization is joined-
up government. This alternative governance aims to inspire government 
actors to coordinate and harmonize their thinking and action toward 
common objectives (Ling 2002; Pollitt 2003; Fimreite, Christensen, and 
Lægreid 2012). Within that context of harmonic thinking and action, 
joined-up government is not an entity of coordination but a long-term 
cooperative process and mechanism or an enabler that emphasizes a 
democratic, participative political freedom to ensure government organi-
zations cooperate to create innovation (Ling 2002; Pollitt 2003; Davies 
2009; Fimreite, Christensen, and Lægreid 2012). However, joined-up 
government can transform into a form of integration (Martorell and 
Abergel 2018). Despite that contrast, the tenet of joined-up government 
either as an integration of policy or an enabler of collaboration is sig-
nificantly similar because they both advocate for participative decision-
making to reach common objectives. 
As a democratic and participative mechanism, the joined-up govern-
ment aims to overcome existing hierarchies of involved organizations 
and improve information flow (Agranoff and McGuire 2001; Kavanagh 
and Richards 2001; Pollitt 2003; Davies 2009; Carey and Crammond 
2015). However, because nothing is solid, this alternative governance 
has limitations. First, the participative mechanisms advocated by joined-
up government can be degraded if some parties are imposing their 
power and interests rather than working cooperatively (Davies 2009). 
Second, because joined-up government is a process rather than an en-
tity, the concept requires a distinct means of performance measurement 
(Kavanagh and Richards 2001; Pollitt 2003; Fimreite, Christensen, and 
Lægreid 2012).
Studies on joined-up government can produce an enormous amount 
of contextual knowledge and evidence from other jurisdictions’ experi-
ences about what works and what does not. These studies are signifi-
cant because they inform policy analysts regarding future initiatives for 
planning and implementation (Carey and Crammond 2015). Although 
evidence hierarchies have ranked hard evidence or scientific evidence 
relatively higher than evidence produced from individual, communi-
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ties, or countries’ experiences (Wolf and Baehler 2017), the latter type 
of evidence has the function of predicting and projecting the expected 
results (Rose 2002; Head 2008; Ettelt, Mays, and Nolte 2012). In the 
context of preventing terrorist-financing offenses, evidence of joined-up 
government within various countries can be analyzed to design an in-
teragency coordination model that is appropriate to apply in Indonesian 
policy settings.
Generating and adapting evidence from other countries’ experiences 
is commonly referred to as knowledge utilization (Rose 2002), a concept 
with an integrated structure that comprises information pick-up, infor-
mation interpretation, and information application (Ettelt, Mays, and 
Nolte 2012). A study applied the concepts of abduction and phronesis 
and demonstrated that the capacity to utilize and adapt that type of evi-
dence to their policy settings stems, in part, from an analyst’s subjective 
judgment developed through frequent policy experiences while com-
paring others’ policy settings with their own (Wolf and Baehler 2017). 
That comparative analysis and analogy-making are modeled through 
a base scenario (Wolf and Baehler 2017). The model focuses on com-
parisons between the existing problems (the base case-A) with the rel-
evant policies from other cases (the exemplar-B) to create the intended 
results (the prospective case-A )`. This comparison is a process in search 
of ideas relevant to an individual’s problems (Bardach 2004, 206). In 
a comparison of B to A, analysts will develop causal narratives (Rose 
2002) on social mechanisms (Barzelay 2007) that explain the processes 
within B that successfully stimulate its outcomes. Furthermore, based 
on these narratives, the analysts simultaneously make analogical con-
nections between B and A while considering A’s context and policy 
objectives as they consider how lessons from B might lead to intended 
results in A. This base scenario emphasizes iterative processes that en-
able the analysts to rethink and redesign policy problems, performance 
indicators, or intended outcomes (Wolf and Baehler 2017).
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R ESEA RCH METHOD
This article applies textual analysis (Thomas 2013) to draw on contextu-
al evidence from four exemplar countries, namely, Australia, Malaysia, 
Saudi Arabia, and Singapore, that can be adapted to what might be an 
effective policy on Indonesian settings. The selection criteria applied 
to these countries are as follows: (1) their effectiveness and technical 
compliance ratings as documented by the FATF Consolidated Table 
(The Financial Action Task Force 2019) and (2) the context similari-
ties between these countries and Indonesia that follow criteria such as 
psychological factors and countries’ interdependence (Rose 2002). 
The evidence is retrieved from primary and secondary sources pub-
lished by governments and non-governmental organizations. The pri-
mary sources are four documents on the Mutual Evaluation Review of 
the four countries and two follow-up reports—one each—from Australia 
and Malaysia. In this article, we assume that the primary sources are 
relatively authoritative such that they can illustrate countries’ current 
and ongoing policies. The secondary sources are nine peer-reviewed 
academic articles and other publications that have analyzed topics rel-
evant to this paper and that are related to terrorist financing. 
The evidence-generating process applies a cross-checking approach 
to primary and secondary sources with a focus on the comparative 
analysis of countries and analogy-making to project and predict the ex-
pected results (Wolf and Baehler 2017). In this analysis, evidence is cat-
egorized based on the policy instruments and coordination mechanisms 
as expounded in Table 1 and the theories of joined-up government. The 
finding categories is summarized in Table 3. Furthermore, we com-
pared and interpreted that evidence to find the potential interagency 
coordination mechanisms that effectively prevent nonprofits from com-
mitting terrorist-financing offenses. The categories are as follows:
Table 3 
The finding categories
Policy instruments Coordination mechanisms
Integrated databases Objective-setting processes
Information-sharing system Functions and responsibilities arrangements
Risk-based approach Synchronized individual policies 
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Socialization and education Minimizing problems related to hierarchy 
Monitoring and supervision Performance measurement 
Investigation and prosecution
Immediate outcome is reducing nonprofits’ 
vulnerabilities to terrorist-financing offenses
Source: Compiled by the author from related sources
EV IDENCE FROM THE EX EMPL A R 
COUNTR IES’  EX PER IENCES
Evidence drawn from the exemplar countries illustrates the manifesta-
tion of national strategies to enact terrorist-financing measures that can 
stimulate involved authorities to implement an effective coordination 
mechanism to prevent terrorist-financing offenses by nonprofits. The 
effects of these national strategies can be observed from two elements 
of the countries’ coordination mechanisms. The first element is syn-
chronizing actions, objectives, and policies, and the second is arranging 
the organizations’ functions and responsibilities within an interagency 
coordination framework. However, despite these countries’ effective 
coordination process, evidence indicates two strategic variations that 
can lead to different consequences. 
The first strategic type is the scaling-up national strategy that main-
streams the discourse of money laundering and terrorist financing in 
a manner that benefits a country’s national interests. To some extent, 
this scaling-up strategy has proven effective in influencing political 
leaders when directing their national agenda and particularly in devel-
oping transparency and accountability among public and private insti-
tutions. The second strategic type is the national strategy that does not 
mainstream the money laundering and terrorist financing discourse at 
the national level. This strategy requires accumulating performance 
indicators from various authorities who are working within a coordina-
tion framework. However, this type has a relatively small influence on 
reframing authorities’ awareness of common objectives and potentially 
leads to departmentalism. Malaysia applies the first type of strategy, 
where the terrorist financing or money laundering system, in general, 
has hegemonic roles that have proven more effective in reframing the 
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actors’ coordinated thinking and actions. Therefore, this scaled-up na-
tional strategy is favorable to synchronize policies, actions, objectives, 
and organizations’ functions and responsibilities to prevent terrorist-
financing offenses by nonprofits.
In policy and objective settings, regardless of their national strategy 
types, exemplar countries have synchronized and interlinked policy in-
struments. In this sense, each instrument has reciprocally affected one 
another. For example, the foremost instrument is a comprehensive risk 
assessment of terrorist financing and nonprofits. This risk assessment 
has functioned as the reference before formulating and implement-
ing other instruments such as information-sharing systems, monitoring 
and supervision, or socialization and education. Some exemplar coun-
tries have detailed risk profiles on nonprofits’ financial and managerial 
information or their typical financial transactions. To some extent, a 
comprehensive risk document must be beneficial to inform actors of 
the policy and operational levels. Furthermore, the evidence in the 
literature has emphasized that the absence of the document may result 
in various unstructured, fragmented instruments.
Two variations are common in organization arrangements: dual-
function authorities act as an investigator and supervisor, and a group of 
authorities have specific functions in an ad hoc committee. Despite the 
differences, the two variations are the means to exercise power over the 
regulated parties. The advantage of having powerful or dual-function 
entities is minimizing the barrier related to hierarchical organizations. 
However, this type of authority, if not balanced with social control from 
other parties, may degrade collaborative thinking and actions such that 
one organization becomes dominant and politically imposes their power 
on nonprofits and other government institutions. By contrast, because 
the ad hoc type is typically case-driven, it has been more advisable 
for the operational rather than the policy level. However, the ad hoc 
is more favorable for an organization arrangement to prevent terrorist 
financing. This platform would potentially stimulate collaborative co-
ordination instead of the polarization of powers within small parts of 
an interagency coordination framework.
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The evidence drawn has illustrated two aspects: the mechanisms 
of coordination within exemplar countries and the effectiveness of the 
attempts to prevent terrorist-financing offenses by nonprofits that are 
driven by these existing mechanisms. Figure 1 shows a comparison be-
tween Indonesia and the four exemplar countries based on the evidence 
produced from the exemplar countries’ experiences and the Indonesian 
problems as described in the Introduction section. However, the clas-
sification has functioned as an illustration of Indonesia’s current policies 
and instruments and how they may be more likely to increase rather 
than decrease terrorist-financing risks. The proposed joined-up govern-
ment adapted from the exemplar countries’ experience is proposed as 
a means to move Indonesia’s position to the top-right area in Figure 1. 
Figure 1 
Country comparison of the prevention of terrorist-financing offenses by nonprofits
Source: Compiled by author from related sources
JOINED -UP GOV ER NMENT MECH A NISMS 
FOR PR EV ENTING TER ROR IST-FINA NCING 
OFFENSES BY NONPROFITS
The Indonesian authorities may apply several means to improve its in-
teragency coordination. First, Kemendagri, Kemenkumham, Kemenlu, 
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Kemenag, and Kemensos must match, integrate, and post their databas-
es on an online platform accessible to other authorities. Furthermore, 
the NCC must temporarily assign an ad hoc interministerial group to 
be responsible for the registration and validation of nonprofits before 
permanently transferring these processes to Kemendagri as the single 
registrar. 
Second, Kemendagri, Kepolisian RI, PPATK, BNPT, and BIN must 
conduct and frequently evaluate risk assessment documents on non-
profits and terrorist financing to identify the vulnerabilities and the 
changing trends of terrorist-financing threats. This assessment must be 
democratic and deliberative with active participation from nonprofits 
as the regulated sector. As a response to the results of that assessment, 
Kemendagri and PPATK—through legal arrangements—may define 
nonprofits as reporting parties in the AMLCFT regime. Moreover, Ke-
mendagri and PPATK must escalate the results to the NCC to obtain 
political commitments to ensure effective processes in resource alloca-
tion and policy synchronization.
Third, according to the risk assessment results, PPATK and Ke-
mendagri must cooperate with nonprofits to formulate the means and 
priorities of socialization and education. This participative process is 
necessary to design the tailormade programs that are advisable for the 
nonprofit sector, for example, management of the reports on donations 
and the annual financial statement. Monitoring and supervision are set 
as the sequence of socialization and education to stimulate nonprofits’ 
voluntary compliance. Fourth, this article strongly recommends the 
network model within ad hoc and case-based working groups as the 
voluntary information-sharing mechanism. This model potentially cre-
ates more flexibility and minimizes problems related to hierarchical 
structures.
CONCLUSION
The proposed model that has been drawn from the exemplar countries’ 
experiences may not comprise ideal mechanisms to solve the drawbacks 
of Indonesia’s interagency coordination in preventing terrorist-financing 
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offenses. Indonesia’s coordination mechanisms are complex because 
they have involved different authorities to reach a common goal; more-
over, the policies, functions, and responsibilities implemented to reach 
that common goal were fragmented and unstructured. Evidence from 
the four countries that we investigated illustrates that effective inter-
agency coordination that is likely to reduce the risks of terrorist financ-
ing should first synchronize the policies, objectives, functions, and re-
sponsibilities among the authorities. Then, authorities can prioritize the 
allocation of interventions and resources to the most vulnerable factors. 
This article suggests four improvements: collaborative improvements 
toward single integrated databases; comprehensive risk assessments of 
nonprofits; prioritizing socialization, education, monitoring, and super-
vision; and a network model to improve voluntary information sharing.
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